The opportunities afforded by the increase in international trade are significant. The
U.S. economy has gained from the surge in trade in three ways: (1) the growth in national
income; (2) the emergence of new markets; and (3) the decline in the cost of goods.
Specifically:
Productivity gains from the high-technology segments of U.S. export industries have
contributed to growth in the gross domestic product (GDP) and in incomes.
As firms have increased their output, labor productivity has grown, raising the real
wages of workers in these sectors. In the past two decades, labor productivity in the U.S.
has increased by 25 percent. 3
Domestic producers have enjoyed the benefits of economies of scale as new markets have
emerged.
Growth in exports has had a ripple effect, making new markets viable targets for U.S.
industries. The development of new markets for the Nations products has also
generated significant economies of scale. With the growth in markets for final products,
the markets for intermediate inputs have grown, and the linkages among the firms within
the supply chain have allowed producers to expand production. The resulting critical mass
and efficiency gains have further reduced production costs, as the growing backward and
forward linkages in the manufacturing process have helped to generate network density. 4
Average costs in many sectors have declined, as markets have become more competitive.
As trade has grown, production costs have declined through a combined process of
removing monopolistic inefficiencies, applying technologies that improve productivity,
re-engineering the firm-level production process, and streamlining the movement of goods
within the supply-chain network. Downward declines in transportation and inventory
carrying costs relative to GDP - from more than 16 percent of GDP a decade ago to about 10
percent today - illustrate the cost-reduction benefits of the growing efficiency of global
outsourcing.
Declining transportation costs, coupled with global wage differentials and the
universal availability of information technologies, has stimulated global outsourcing
among the goods-producing sectors of the economy.
It is now cheaper to assemble components produced and shipped from all over the globe
than to try to minimize transportation costs and manufacture the goods in the proximity of
the final consumption market. Integrated supply-chain management has allowed trading
partners to trim costs by fully integrating transportation into the production and
marketing process. Today, the logistics pipeline relies on transportation as its motive
power, linking warehousing, distribution, inventory, marketing, sales, supply management,
and manufacturing. Integrated supply-chain management has been created by connecting
suppliers and customers at each end of the supply chain, with full transparency of the
operations ensured through an efficient computerized interface system.
To reduce costs for each link within the supply chain, shippers have undertaken drastic
process re-engineering.
Just-in-time production management techniques have cut costs by reducing inventories.
Freight transportation costs at the aggregate level have been steadily declining (partly
due to deregulation), to about 6 percent of GDP. Freight carriers are expected to continue
to lower shippers logistics costs by offering value-added services. Today,
supply-chain management is increasingly driven from the demand side. "Mass
customization" is in demand, as transportation carriers are asked to provide a higher
level of operating flexibility for the customer (e.g., in routing and pricing), and to
offer customized logistics service as opposed to the traditional point-to-point shipping
service. Full integration of logistics and transportation is taking place through
shippers attempts to leverage their positions when negotiating customized service
contracts with carriers.
Despite these benefits and opportunities, the challenges resulting from global
trade are significant. Threats to the continued ability of the transportation system to
meet the needs of trading partners warrant a strong Federal role in promoting a
technology-intensive freight infrastructure.
The 1999 DOT report on the U.S. Marine Transportation System (MTS) identifies a number
of trends affecting the Nations ports and intermodal infrastructure and the
competitiveness of the U.S. marine transportation system, including: 5
Competing water uses and the increasing size, speed, and mix of container
vessels, passenger ferries, and recreational boats: The MTS report warns that
"the increased use, coupled with vessel speed and size, will place additional demands
on already congested waterways" (p. 34).
Growing dredging requirements: The report notes that some of this growth
has been stimulated by the increased maintenance needed to meet the service demands of the
maritime industry and that "the net effect could be a gradual upward trend in future
annual dredging requirements" (p. 33).
Intermodal connections and land-side access to ports and terminals: As
stated in the MTS report, "the intermodal connections between the transportation
modes are often the weakest links in the Nations transportation system." The
report cites a 1997 Maritime Administration study of 58 ports, including 31 container
ports, which identified a number of infrastructure impediments, such as traffic congestion
on local truck routes, limited availability of truck turning lanes, and lack of near-dock
rail terminals that would ease transfer of containers from rail to vessel (pp. 51-52).
This strategic plan focuses on a number of specific challenges confronting the U.S.
freight transportation system:
Port facilities are increasingly unable to meet the demands of containerships for
better port access and on-dock container handling.
The expanding size of containerships has severely strained the resources of major load
centers for facility modernization. Rapid rates of containerization, coupled with the
imperative to reduce costs, have led to the emergence of large-capacity containerships.
In 1990, less than 6 percent of U.S. containerized cargo was moved on ships of 4,000
twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) or more. By 2010, ships in the 4,000 to 6,000 TEU
class will handle 30 percent of the cargo.6 With container vessels growing in size to 6,000
to 8,000 TEUs, ports face significant infrastructure modernization challenges. Shallow
navigational channels and environmental regulations restricting the disposal of
contaminated sediments have impeded the ability of ports to handle international cargo
efficiently.
Demands for high-capacity terminal lift equipment have compounded the costs of
dredging. Steamship carriers specifications for a "super container hub"
have sparked further competition among ports for expansion and capacity improvement.
Recently, Maersk Lines and Sea-Land Service put out capacity requirements for such a hub
that included up to 16 post-Panamax cranes; 6,000 contiguous feet of berth; on-dock or
near-dock rail; and the ability to handle 550,000 lifts annually. Currently, not one of
the East Coast ports can offer these ocean carriers what they need. 7

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Figure 1. U.S. Ports and Intermodal Facilities
Land-side access bottlenecks and lack of adequate on-dock or near-dock rail pose other
impediments. Only 40 percent of the container traffic on the West Coast and 24 percent on
the East Coast moves by rail. The impediments faced by ports were addressed in a 1993
Transportation Research Board study. 8 This report cited a number of port constraints,
including lack of bridge or tunnel clearance to accommodate double-stack trains for more
than one-third of container ports; at-grade crossing on local streets, where trains tie up
local traffic at half of all ports; inadequate access routes for trucks; local opposition
to land-side improvements; and regulation of wetlands and dredged sediment disposal.
Finally, vessel logistics and cost-minimization objectives of steamship companies have
reduced the number of ports of call. This has led to the funneling of container traffic
through a handful of load centers on each coast, compounding other access problems and
creating severe capacity constraints. 9
Outcome goals 1 and 2 of this plan address the technology application strategies
relevant to port throughput and intermodal terminal capacity.
Capacity constraints hamper railroads and other intermodal carriers
abilities to meet the demand for container shipments while responding to pressures to cut
costs.
As global container trade has grown, U.S. railroads and other intermodal carriers have
become severely capacity-constrained; at the same time, the competitive post-deregulation
environment has intensified pressures to reduce costs. In the aftermath of the 1980
Staggers Act, U.S. railroads face competitive pressures to cut costs. The move toward
consolidation is partly in response to these pressures. The more competitive environment
has reduced the Nations total freight logistics costs from more than 16 percent of
GDP to less than 11 percent. Though railroad profits have risen in some segments,
intermodal operations have for the most part generated lower levels of profit. (These
operations account for 18 percent of railroad revenues, but less than 10 percent of
profits.) Recent rail service disruptions, capacity shortages, and "service
meltdowns" at the Nations ports and rail terminals have been due in part to
merger-related adjustment difficulties and the "bunching" of container traffic
that occurs during peak periods of vessel loading and unloading. 10
Advanced technologies have allowed U.S. railroads to pursue aggressive modernization
programs to deal with the pressures to cut costs. These technologies have allowed
railroads to reduce track miles and locomotives in service while carrying more freight and
having fewer accidents. In 1995, Class I railroads carried some 2 billion tons of cargo, a
16 percent increase from the 1.6 billion tons carried in 1980 (while the railroads lost
market share to trucks in the same period). To compete with trucks, Class I railroads have
had to keep costs down while maintaining a high level of capital investment. By investing
in track infrastructure and new freight car technologies, the railroads have improved
their capacity, and can now carry heavier loads and provide greater ton-miles of service
on fewer miles of track.
New investments notwithstanding, track and yard congestion has posed a serious problem
for rail carriers for the first time in U.S. history. Compounding track capacity shortages
have been the higher maintenance costs due to the increasing average gross weight per
train, higher locomotive speeds, more frequent train dispatching schedules, aging track
infrastructure, and deteriorating rail bridges. Although rail operations are relatively
safe and the number of rail accidents has been steadily declining, the publicity generated
by recent incidents, coupled with downsizing practices that have reduced the number of
maintenance workers, has given rise to popular concerns about the safety of rail freight
transportation. 11
Outcome goals 1, 2, and 3 address the strategies recommended for supporting
next-generation rail and intermodal technologies and for funding advanced intermodal
terminals.
The costs of financing modern, large-scale, multi-jurisdictional freight facilities are
spiraling.
The high costs of financing a modern terminal and the multi-jurisdictional nature of
many advanced technology projects preclude effective single-source financing strategies
for deployment of state-of-the-art freight technologies. For example, the Alameda
Corridor project cost close to $2 billion and took more than a decade to plan, finance,
and construct. Another project, the Freight Action Strategy (FAST) in Washington State,
required legislative action and a public referendum for planning and financing.
Private stakeholders and local decision makers often lack the ability to formulate
strategies that provide a globally optimal solution. The short planning horizon of the
private sector, and the inability to capture non-local or non-commercial benefits from
projects of national significance, preclude effective investment strategies at the local
level. Often, the optimal approach to capacity shortages and congestion lies not at the
local source of the problem, but at the regional or corridor levels - where infrastructure
strategies such as feeder ports and revitalization of short-haul railroads provide the
best solution.
Outcome goals 3 and 4 address the strategies related to promoting next-generation rail
and marine technologies, joint use of underutilized military facilities, and shared
information systems and technology standards.
Freight technologies are becoming increasingly complex.
The growing complexity and sophistication of freight technologies has created the need
to set standards for interoperability and to facilitate data sharing.
Outcome goal 4 addresses efforts to coordinate the development of standard technology
protocols and shared information systems.
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