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National Transportation Technology Plan

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8. TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE ASSURANCE

VISION

A transportation infrastructure that is secure from acts of terrorism and crime and that adapts rapidly to natural or intentional disruptions.

GOAL

Develop a comprehensive approach to assessing threats to the security of transportation’s physical and information infrastructure and to implementing integrated security technologies and procedures tailored to these threats.

NEAR-TERM OUTCOMES

Increase the detection of explosive devices and weapons that may be brought aboard aircraft.

Get threat information to those who need to act within 24 hours, at least 90 percent of the time.

MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM

Recent events in the United States and in other parts of the world have focused considerable attention on the potential occurrence of major incidents of public terrorism. In our own country, such incidents have included the bombings of the World Trade Center in New York City, the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, and the Olympic Park in Atlanta. Throughout the rest of the world there have been bombings and chemical weapon attacks in Japan, Europe, the Middle East, South America, and Africa. The high level of concern about terrorism is reflected in the President’s creation of a Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection and a White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security.

Historically, transportation is among the most visible and frequent targets of terrorist attacks, and recent terrorist incidents have reinforced that observation. Yet another security concern in transportation is cargo theft. Estimates place the losses resulting from such theft at over $13 billion a year.

REQUIREMENTS

Assessing the potential threat to transportation facilities and the range of measures that can be taken to guard against them requires the participation and assent of all organizations, both public and private, involved in transportation operations and oversight. This includes numerous Federal agencies with transportation, law enforcement, and threat-analysis responsibilities, as well as their state and local counterparts; transit and port authorities; and private transportation providers.

Among other topics, this partnership addresses the following:

Physical security of terminals.

Security of vital communication and information systems.

Development and dissemination of information about security incidents, as well as assessments of the potential threats to transportation facilities and operators.

In particular, this partnership supports the Transportation Subgroup of the NSTC Committee on Technology’s Critical Infrastructure Protection R&D Interagency Working Group, by identifying current and new R&D activities that are necessary to (1) protect the nation’s transportation infrastructure, operators, and users against future acts of terrorism and crime, and (2) enable the transportation system to adapt rapidly to natural or intentional disruptions.

INVESTMENT STRATEGY

Participants

Federal: DOT (FAA, FHWA, FRA, FTA, ITS Joint Program Office, MARAD, RSPA, USCG); DOD; DOJ (FBI, INS, NIJ); NSF; Treasury (U.S. Customs)-- all lead agencies.

Other: State and local law enforcement agencies; port and airport authorities; transportation service providers (airlines, bus lines, transit agencies, trucking companies, ship lines, railroads, parcel and freight companies).

Management

Partners undertake this initiative under the overall guidance of the NSTC, with each providing resources and support as required. In the case of freight terminals, the executive staff of the National Cargo Security Council has offered to collaborate closely with the initiative’s partners.

Critical Technology Elements and Activities

This partnership is undertaking the following activities, as illustrated in the accompanying technology roadmap:

Transportation Community Awareness and Understanding: This includes (1) outreach events on topics related to passenger and freight security, and (2) an ongoing program of system-level vulnerability assessments at major transportation terminals (air, rail, transit, port).

Identification of Best Practices: This activity is assessing a number of operational concepts and designs for an integrated security approach, documenting those that have proven to be the most effective, and identifying where further technological or procedural improvements are needed. Future efforts will build on the May 1999 report, Intermodal Cargo Transportation: Industry Best Security Practices.

Identify Key Technologies and Research Needs: This effort seeks to characterize the security technologies currently available, identify their potential application in an integrated security approach, and determine where further technology development is required.

Funding Requirement

Funding will be provided from a mix of Federal, State, and local government and private sources. Federal funding will be determined through the annual budget process.

TECHNICAL CHALLENGES AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

One of the most interesting technical challenges for this partnership is determining the best means of successfully implementing countermeasures originally developed for one mode or environment -- for example, airports-- in another mode or environment with different characteristics, operational procedures, and resource levels.

Moreover, a major non-technical issue is that transportation operations require the effective cooperation of a variety of institutions, some of which have differing or even conflicting perspectives and goals. Any major security feature must achieve at least the consent of these varying organizations to be implemented successfully.

ACRONYMS