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5. Conclusions and Countermeasures
The lack of definitive cargo loss and theft data necessary to establish the scope and
extent of security weaknesses is disturbing and denies transportation, public safety, and
security professionals a very important tool in the prevention of unlawful activity.
Locations of where cargo is compromised remains elusive; as well as the amount and
frequency at which cargo theft or diversion occurs. This situation makes the development
and implementation of countermeasures all the more difficult. Efforts to collect and
analyze this data must be instituted, preferably through government-industry cooperative
efforts. At this time, a good first step is one of industry’s attempt to collect and
disseminate cargo theft data throughout the shipping and law enforcement communities
identified as the TIPS II database system, a creation of the Transportation Loss
Prevention and Security Council of the American Trucking Association. This system is
currently in use by major highway shipping companies as well as Federal, state, and local
law enforcement.
The diversity in cargo physical/information security topics and overall business
architecture demonstrates the need for a systemwide analysis of cargo security. This
analysis should not only address physical and procedural security, but address the
business and legal infrastructures which impact upon security (such as taxation,
insurance, anti-trust, organized labor, and organized crime concerns). The systemwide
analysis and risk assessment of cargo security would have to include analysis of physical
security plans and standard operation procedures in the cargo transportation community to
address potential threats by considering the following elements:
- Electronic Data Interchange (EDI)
- Perimeter (fencelines, entrances/access points, docks, mooring)
- Cargo container vulnerabilities
- Cargo Storage (high value commodities)
- Seal Accountability
- Internal Accountability
Further study should be made into the international trade routes from which cargo
shipments originate. It is recommended that further government efforts focus on methods of
verifying EDI networks and shipping methods at foreign locations and validating cargo
prior to shipment into the United States. The security of both the item shipped (seals,
alarms, tracking, locks) and access to that item internationally and nationwide
(identification, background investigations, etc.) with the goal of creating uniform
guidelines, requirements, or standards.
Joint Federal and industry efforts should be undertaken to standardize cargo security
requirements. Examples of issues for possible exploration are: establishment of a uniform
personnel background investigation requirement and the related establishment of a
nationwide scheme for personnel access and identification.
In order to provide a platform for demonstration of security concerns across intermodal
transportation, and to foster political support for improvements in transportation
physical and information security, a series of "test beds" should be established
in selected ports and facilities. The results of these demonstrations will be used as case
studies to greatly assist in the identification of the scope and extent of cargo loss,
allow for prioritization of equipment and procedures to recommend and surface possible
remedies to augment security guidelines.
Furthermore, programs of all Federal Government agencies exercising authority over
programs, which effect cargo and shipping, should be analyzed. The resultant objective
will be the creation of a cargo security program that integrates Federal requirements with
commercial industry best practices and may be used as a benchmark in the industry by which
all could use to enhance safety and security. One such initiative that the Port of New
York/New Jersey has implemented is an employee program known as "Crime Watch".
This program has been very successful in providing law enforcement with crucial
information regarding cargo theft and other violations.
Technology improvements in the areas of non-intrusive cargo screening and cargo
intrusion/tracking need to be evaluated for specific applicability to the interests of
contraband detection, and suppression of criminal/terrorist use of the transportation
infrastructure. Further, coordinated development of non-intrusive cargo inspection, cargo
tracking, and cargo intrusion detection systems will be helpful in preventing duplication
of government efforts, but more importantly will aid in the detection of specific points
in shipment where loss/tampering occurs.
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