Volpe Center: Transportation Strategic Plans

Intermodal Cargo Transportation: Industry Best Security Practices

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4. Best Practices

Cargo security is more than a function of physical security measures, it is also one of management resolve and institutional/procedural control. Regardless of the level of resolve and operational security procedures, total cargo security is impacted by the number of individual companies within a shipping route through which a shipment passes, as well as the number of institutional procedures it must pass. As each company has its own procedures, the security of a shipment subjected to several modes during a transit is inversely enhanced according to the number of hands it must pass. The more uniform the security controls and accountability are, the greater the level of transit integrity. "Exclusive" shippers, i.e., those who own and operate the entire route from start to finish generally suffer the least amount of security breaches and loss from outside sources. The degree of loss and risk increases as more entities are given access and control of shipments.

Based on this study, carriers who place the most management emphasis on security have the most successful security programs. These carriers tend to have established standards for all contract carriers; subject those carriers to periodic audits to ensure standards compliance; and rely on strict contractual arrangements. Provisions of a similar nature are being enacted by a consortium of American computer manufacturers known as Technology Asset Protection Association (TAPA), in an attempt to standardize security procedures and enforce liability with specific regard to facilities that handle its shipments (see Appendix C).

Further discussion leads to the approach for implementing the industry provided Best Practices and each category is explained below, with examples of best practices from various providers, and the U.S. Customs Service.

Policy, Procedures, and Guidelines

Research for this first phase of "best practices" identification indicates that each participant in the transportation of cargo is actively engaging in practices that are designed to maintain, or in some cases increase, the integrity of security systems while achieving increased security of the cargo in transit. Successful preparedness ensures the selection of optimal policies and procedures, their documentation in clear and widely distributed plans, their integration into Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) wherever possible, and their effective implementation through comprehensive and effective training programs and drills. These programs have been shown to be quite effective as demonstrated by the Port of New York/New Jersey’s "24 Point Security Program".

Industry Recommendations

Conduct a program of periodic security seminars for all employees involved in cargo handling and documentation processing, stressing the importance of the following:
- Maintaining legible and accurate cargo tallies.
- Processing only legible documents.
- Writing only in ink or ballpoint pen.
- Completing all information required by shipping documents.
- Obtaining clearly written signatures.
- Safeguarding the confidentiality of shipping and entry documents.
- Maintaining good cargo security generally.
Include posters, stickers, payroll stuffers, monetary incentives, and properly worded reward signs in the security awareness program.

Collection and Dissemination of Data

The first step in reducing the problem of cargo crime at terminals is the assessment of the size and nature of the problem or, in other words, the collection of data. One industry attempt to collect and disseminate cargo theft data is the TIPS II database system, a creation of the Transportation Loss Prevention and Security Council of the American Trucking Association (ATA). In addition, some state and local law enforcement agencies have developed systems to compile cargo security data for their region. Cargo TIPS II is a secure Internet system that consists of the following major components:

Cargo Theft Report – Allows entering, editing, and updating of theft reports
Reports and research – Unlimited database research
U.S. Customs theft reports by commodity, location, time period, etc.
Hot Sheet – Bulletin board/E-mail alert system

Also critical to reducing crime is the dissemination of information, which allows carriers and others to take actions with the goal of strategically reducing losses. Insurers are taking an active role in working to reduce losses. For example, CIGNA Insurance Companies provides CIGNA Ports of the World, a guide to aid traders and shippers. The guide includes current port conditions, guidelines for assure secure cargo transportation, and recommendations to minimize cargo loss and damage. In addition, the Port of New York/New Jersey Police have implemented a 24 Point Security Program, which provides guidelines for a series of best practices and a security awareness program known as "Crime Watch," which affords employees the ability to report crimes and receive a monetary reward.

Industry Recommendations

Develop a comprehensive system for the accurate collection of cargo theft data.
Provide shippers with up-to-date information.

Coordination and Cooperation

Several terminals studied have developed cooperative entities and programs to address specific crime issues. For example, in response to extensive problems with organized crime in the New York/New Jersey port district, the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor was established in 1953. Today, the Waterfront Commission has broad investigative, licensing, regulatory, and police authority over piers and terminals in the port district. It investigates criminal activity, registers and licenses longshoremen, stevedore companies, hiring agents, pier superintendents and pier guards, regulates and monitors dock employment, and exercises broad police authority.³⁴

Multidisciplinary programs are in use at some terminals to target cargo crime. These programs like "Operation Kat-Net", involved New York’s Port Authority Police, regional police organizations, FBI, and the states District Attorney’s Office and focused on reducing cargo crime in targeted high-theft areas. Several other undercover operations were implemented to reduce incidents of crime. Operation conducted by the FBI’s San Jose-based high-tech crime squad — Operation "Dragon Teeth" in 1994, Operation "Chiptryster" in 1995, Operation "Westchips" in February, 1996 and Operation "Bytes Dust" in April, 1996 have put a significant dent in premises thefts, particularly in California. Those arrested in these roundups have also been linked to home invasions, money laundering and counterfeiting activities, illegal gambling, fictitious business frauds, as well as a myriad of drug and weapons violations.³⁵

Industry Recommendations

Use regional multijurisdictional entities focused on reducing crime.
Implement multidisciplinary cargo theft task force programs.
Design undercover law enforcement operations directed at specific problem areas.

Personnel Issues

Employee and Independent Contractor Background Checks

Operators of cargo handling facilities should conduct employment screening of prospective employees. (Customs Regulations, already require international carriers, proprietors of bonded warehouses, and customhouse brokers to submit employee lists upon request from the district Director of Customs. Such lists should contain the name, address, social security number, and date and place of birth of each employee and be kept up to date.) For example, the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor actively monitors port employment, providing licenses for longshoremen, checkers, hiring agents, pier superintendents, pier guards, stevedore companies, and telecommunication systems controllers.³⁶

Industry Recommendations

Require all personnel, including maintenance and clerical personnel, who will have access to cargo areas and shipment-related documentation to submit a detailed employment application, which contains a photograph of the applicant, a list of past residences, and a prior employment history for the preceding 10 years.
Screen all such applicants for the following:
- Verification of address and prior employment,
- Credit record, and
- Criminal record, if possible.
The background and corporate structure of independent contractors providing janitorial service, refuse disposal, or other service should be verified. Access by independent contractors to the facility should be under security controls by performing the following activities:
- Periodically examine independent contractor vehicles, which are parked in or near cargo areas.
- Permit independent contractor employees to enter only those areas necessary for their particular work; permit them access to cargo areas and areas where shipping documents are located only under the supervision of security and/or management personnel.
- Require independent contractors to display identification similar to that required by the facility for its own employees.

Security Staff

Operators of cargo handling facilities should employ a Security Officer or assign a particular officer of the firm to be responsible for security. All operators handling a substantial volume of international cargo should provide guards to protect the cargo.

Industry Recommendations

Employ a number of guards adequate to provide appropriate security for the size of each facility and the volume of cargo handled. Alarm systems, closed-circuit television, and other security devices may reduce the number of guards needed.
Train all company employee guard forces or ensure that contract guard forces are trained in the following:
- Methods of patrolling terminals and warehouses
- Use of firearms and other equipment that may be furnished
- Report writing, log and record keeping
- Identification of security problems and specific trouble areas
The security manager should appoint a person to be in charge of the training function. But beware: Appointing a trainer who does not quite understand the security function could seriously compromise the effectiveness of the security program. ³⁷
Equip the guard forces with uniforms that are complete, distinctive, and authoritative in appearance.
Provide firearms, vehicles, communications systems, and other equipment deemed necessary for the successful performance of the guard function.
Insist on physical fitness as a prime consideration in selecting a guard force. Require guards to undergo self-defense training similar to that of police agencies. Require a physical examination at least once a year.
Furnish each guard with a manual covering operating procedures and standards of conduct, and clear statement of what management expects.
Ensure adequate and reliable communications between elements of the terminal security force and from the security force to local police.
Provide security personnel with a telephone at fixed posts or two-way radio, intercom, duress signal communication, or other type of equipment providing voice communication capability within the company.
Arrange assured means (telephone, radio, or special alarm line) for summoning assistance from local forces.
Provide training on appropriate cargo handling and loading procedures as well as appropriate cargo documentation handling.

Identification System

All operators of facilities handling a substantial volume of cargo should employ an identification card system to identify personnel authorized to enter cargo and document processing areas. If a facility is not implementing an access control system for authorized entry, then, at a minimum, an identification card system should be implemented.

Industry Recommendations

Include the following information on the ID card: (a) physical description or, preferably, a color photograph of the holder, (b) name and address, (c) date of birth, (d) employer’s license number, if any, (e) signature of holder, and (f) reasonable expiration date.
Laminate all cards to prevent alterations
Assign each card a control number.
Recover ID cards from terminated employees.
Require each employee to display his or her ID card to gain access to the facility, to cargo areas within the facility, and to areas where shipping document are processed. Preferably, the ID card should be displayed so that it is visible at all times that the employee is within the facility.

Facility Access Control Measures

Many transportation companies, ports, or port facilities have taken steps to reduce system vulnerability to acts of theft by using various access control measures. All cargo handling and storage facilities should provide a physical barrier against unauthorized access to cargo. Usually this requires a covered structure with walls that can be securely closed and locked.

Some access control equipment, such as gates, is extremely straightforward. Some facilities, however, employ more sophisticated technology such as the following:

Intrusion-detection alarms: Electromechanical, microwave, infrared, dual technology, and acoustic.
Access control: Electronic access control systems, magnetic-card key; employee sign-in procedures, work order procedures, fences and gates, locks, vaults.
Communications: Radio, public address system, emergency station and rail car phones, train annunciator systems, silent alarms.
Vehicle barriers: Concrete barriers for placement to protect system.

Over the last decade, electronic Access Control Systems (ACS) technology has improved significantly in efficiency and reliability. Recent innovations include:

Improvements in off-the-shelf distribution database software.
The introduction of the micro controller (enables fault tolerance and independent decision making for access denial and alarm triggers).
The development of miniature micro-controllers that can be housed in the card reader panel and do not require separate wall panels and wiring.

In addition, CCTV and "smart" building management systems have revolutionized ACS capabilities. Software innovations allow electronic ACS technologies to be integrated with Building Management Systems, Fire Detection and Suppression Systems, and CCTV Surveillance Systems. There are various basic electronic ACS devices:

Card Readers
Alphanumeric Code Entry Systems
Personal Feature Identification (PFI)/Biometric Systems³⁸
Remote Terminal Unit or Local Controller
File Server or Computer Work Station

Fencing

Fencing may be needed:

As supplementary protection to prevent unauthorized persons and vehicles from entering cargo storage and handling areas, and
As sole protection for open storage of bulk cargo or large articles which do not require covered storage because they cannot be easily pilfered or removed without mechanical handling equipment or which have their own inherent security (containers).

Where fencing is required, it should enclose an area around cargo storage structures, support buildings, and exterior stored cargo sufficient to provide maneuvering space for pick-up and delivery vehicles and to prevent use of buildings or cargo to go over fences. The fence line must be inspected regularly for integrity and any damage promptly repaired.

Industry Recommendations

Install chain-link fencing, at least 9 gauge, 2-inch mesh, and at least 8 feet high (not including a barbed wire outrigger). If the level on which the fence is constructed is lower than the area outside the fence line, increase the height of the fence to provide an effective 8-foot fence at all points.
Top the fence with a 2-foot barbed wire outrigger, consisting of double-twisted barbed wire, properly spaced and at a 45-degree angle to the vertical.
Utilize tensioned wire on top of fence fabric in lieu of rigid top rail. Bottom of fence may utilize rigid rail for securing fence fabric to posts.
Place fence posts inside of the fence and secure them in a cement foundation at least 2 feet deep.
If warranted, install a kinetic energy barrier (heavy-grade, tensioned cable secured off the fence to prevent vehicle penetration of fence line)³⁹
Ensure that objects or persons cannot pass beneath the fencing by providing:
- Cement aprons not less than 6 inches thick
- Frame piping
- U-shaped stakes driven approximately 2 feet into the ground
Avoid any condition that compromises the fence line. Prohibit the placing of containers, dunnage, cargo, vehicles, or any other item that may facilitate unlawful entry adjacent to the fence line. Where necessary, install bumpers or fence guards to prevent damage by vehicles.

Gates

Gates provide access for both legitimate and illegal activities. As such, they must be designed into the facility appropriately and monitored on an ongoing basis to achieve an appropriate security level.

Industry Recommendations

Reduce the number of gates in fences to the minimum necessary for access.
Ensure that all fence gates are at least as substantial as the fence.
Gates through which vehicles or personnel enter or exit should be continuously manned or under observation by management or security personnel.
Equip gate with a deadlock bolt or substantially equivalent lock that does not require use of a chain. All hardware connecting the lock to the gate should be strong enough to withstand constant use and attempt to defeat the locking device.
Construct swing-type gates so that they may be secured to the ground when closed.
Separate gates for personnel and vehicle traffic are desirable.

Doors and Windows

All buildings used to house cargo and associated support buildings should be constructed of materials that resist unlawful entry. The integrity of the structure must be maintained by periodic inspection and repair. Security protection should be provided for all doors and windows.

Industry Recommendations

Equip all exterior doors and windows with locks.
Protect all windows through which entry can be made from ground level by safety glass, wire mesh, or bars.
Similarly safeguard all glassed-in areas where shipping documents are processed.
Construct all delivery and receiving doors of steel or other material that will prevent or deter unlawful entry. Keep these doors closed and locked when not in use.
Where fencing is impractical or guards insufficient, equip the building with an intrusion detection or alarm system.
Ensure that there are no avenues for surreptitious entry through floors, roofs, or adjacent buildings.
Equip emergency exits with intrusion alarms. These alarms are equipped with audio alarms, flashing lights, and a verbal annunciator that warns intruders of their unauthorized entry. The alarms are connected, via dedicated lines, to alarms and printers in a secured location.⁴⁰

Locks and Key Control

Locks or locking devices used on buildings, gates, and equipment should be so constructed as to provide positive protection against unauthorized entry. Management or security personnel should control the issuance of all locks and keys.

Industry Recommendations

Use locks having (a) multiple pin tumblers, (b) deadlocking bolts, (c) interchangeable cores, and (d) serial numbers.
To facilitate detection of unauthorized locks, use only locks of standard manufacture displaying the owner’s company name.
Number all keys and obtain a signature from the recipient when issued. Maintain a control file for all keys. Restrict the distribution of master keys to persons whose responsibilities require them to have one.
Safeguard all unissued or duplicate keys.
Remove and secure keys from cargo handling equipment and vehicles when not in use.

Automated Gatehouse Facilities

Automated gatehouse facilities use information systems to match cargo, paperwork, trucks, and drivers at exit points, and are designed to reduce the illegal movement of goods out of facilities. The Seagirt Marine Terminal at the Port of Baltimore uses a computerized gate complex that serves as the nerve center for the terminal. Seagirt’s automated system consolidates the steps necessary to generate the Trailer Interchange Report (TIR). When trucks enter the terminal, an electronic sign-bridge over 13 of the 14 inbound lanes directs the drivers to the appropriate lane, where a remote intercom system serves to quickly exchange information with clerks in the gatehouse. For export traffic, trucks are directed to one of four lanes with built-in scales. While the driver supplies the clerk with the necessary information, the container’s weight is automatically input into the clerk’s computer. The driver then pulls under the gatehouse canopy, where a terminal mechanic inspects the container and chassis for any damage. Should any be found, the Seagirt computer prohibits the clerk from reassigning the equipment until it has been repaired. The driver then receives the TIR and is released into the terminal. The process for import loads is essentially the same. The clerk verifies the driver’s information and that the container has received all the appropriate releases. The clerk then issues the TIR, informing the driver where the container is stored. After picking up the container, the driver goes to one of the five outbound lanes, where a security check and final inspection are performed.⁴¹

Operators of facilities handling a substantial volume of cargo should maintain a manned gate- house at all vehicle entrances and exits during business hours.

Industry Recommendations

Set the gatehouse back from the gate so that vehicles can be stopped and examined on terminal property.
Equip the gatehouse with a telephone, duress, or other communication system.
Clear the area around the gatehouse of any encumbrances that restrict the guard’s line of vision.
Post prominently on the exterior of all gatehouses signs advising drivers and visitors of the conditions of entry. Include in conditions of entry a notice that all vehicles and personnel entering the area are subject to search.
Provide equipment and employ processes to thoroughly verify documents presented by drivers.

Parking Areas

Private passenger vehicles should be prohibited from parking in cargo areas or immediately adjacent to cargo storage buildings. Access to employee parking areas should be subject to security controls.

Industry Recommendations

Locate parking areas outside of fenced operational areas, or at least a substantial distance from cargo handling and storage areas or buildings and support buildings.
Require employees exiting to the parking area from the cargo area to pass through an area under supervision of management or security personnel. Require employees desiring to return to their private vehicles during hours of employment to notify management and/or security personnel.
Allow parking in employee parking areas by permit only. Maintain a record of each issued permit, listing the vehicle registration number, model, color, and year. The permit should consist of a numbered decal, tag, sticker, or sign placed in a uniform location on the vehicle.
Issue to vendors and other visitors temporary parking permits which allow parking in a designated area under security controls.

Lighting

Lighting is a valuable, and generally inexpensive, method of increasing security levels at facilities.

Industry Recommendations

Illuminate all vehicle pedestrian gates, perimeter fence lines, and other outer areas with mercury vapor, sodium vapor, power quartz lamps, or substantially similar high intensity lighting, employing a minimum of 400 watts per fixture. The Society of Illuminating Engineers recommends the following light intensities measured at ground level.

Vehicle and pedestrian areas2.0 foot-candles
Vital structures and other sensitive areas2.0 foot-candles
Unattended outdoor parking areas1.0 foot-candle

Protect lighting subject to vandalism by wire screening or other substantially equivalent means and establish a system of planned maintenance. When installing, locate lights 30 feet above ground level and properly spaced to provide the appropriate light intensity for the area to be illuminated. Adequate lighting should be provided for the following areas:

Entrances, exits, and around gatehouses.
Cargo areas, including container, trailer, aircraft, and rail-car holding areas.
Along fence lines and parking areas.

Monitoring and Tracking

Closed-Circuit Television

The use of closed-circuit television (CCTV) has become increasingly popular in the security industry. CCTV can be used for real-time monitoring and/or video recording, thus providing terminal users a means by which they could view system operations and suspicious activities. The reasons behind employing CCTV technology may vary from location to location, but several applications are generally consistent with this form of surveillance technology (see Table 1).

Table 1: CCTV Technology

Application